Files
mgsh/secrets.go
T
2026-07-28 15:25:54 +02:00

207 lines
6.7 KiB
Go

package main
// secrets.go — a last look at what `push` is about to commit.
//
// `push` runs `git add --all .`, so anything lying in the project — an .env, a
// stray key file, a token pasted into a config — is committed and pushed, and
// with `mirror = true` it reaches a *public* server in the same breath. That is
// the one action in mgsh that cannot be undone: a deleted server repository can
// come back from an archive, a published credential is burnt.
//
// So the staged diff is scanned for a small set of high-signal patterns before
// the commit is made. This is not a complete secret scanner and does not try to
// be one; it aims for a high hit rate on the things that actually leak, with
// few enough false alarms that the prompt still means something. Turn it off
// with `secretscan = off`.
import (
"fmt"
"regexp"
"strconv"
"strings"
)
// secretHit is one suspicious added line.
type secretHit struct {
file string
lineNo int
kind string
text string
}
// secretPattern matches one kind of credential. `certain` patterns are
// unmistakable and are reported as they are; the others match a shape that
// merely looks like a secret and are filtered through looksLikePlaceholder.
type secretPattern struct {
kind string
re *regexp.Regexp
certain bool
}
var secretPatterns = []secretPattern{
{"private key", regexp.MustCompile(`-----BEGIN (?:[A-Z]+ )?PRIVATE KEY-----`), true},
{"GitHub token", regexp.MustCompile(`\bgh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}`), true},
{"GitLab token", regexp.MustCompile(`\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}`), true},
{"AWS access key", regexp.MustCompile(`\b(?:AKIA|ASIA)[0-9A-Z]{16}\b`), true},
{"Slack token", regexp.MustCompile(`\bxox[baprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}`), true},
{"PyPI token", regexp.MustCompile(`\bpypi-AgEIcHlwaS5vcmc[A-Za-z0-9_-]{10,}`), true},
{"credential assignment", regexp.MustCompile(
`(?i)\b(?:password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|apikey|access[_-]?key|auth[_-]?token|token)\b` +
`\s*[:=]\s*(?:"([^"\s]{12,})"|'([^'\s]{12,})'|([^\s"';,]{20,}))\s*;?\s*$`), false},
}
var (
diffFileRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^\+\+\+ b/(.*)$`)
diffHunkRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^@@ -\d+(?:,\d+)? \+(\d+)`)
// a value that is plainly a reference or a stand-in, not a credential
constRefRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*$`)
dottedRefRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[\w-]+(?:\.[\w-]+)+$`)
maskedRe = regexp.MustCompile(`^[*x•.]+$`)
)
// placeholderWords are the values people write when they mean "fill this in".
var placeholderWords = map[string]bool{
"changeme": true, "change_me": true, "password": true, "secret": true,
"token": true, "your_token": true, "your-token": true, "yourtoken": true,
"todo": true, "none": true, "null": true, "example": true, "redacted": true,
}
// looksLikePlaceholder reports whether a matched value is obviously not a real
// credential: a template slot, an environment reference, a constant name, or a
// masked stand-in. Documentation and example files are full of these, and every
// one of them that reaches the prompt makes the prompt worth less.
func looksLikePlaceholder(v string) bool {
v = strings.Trim(v, `"'`)
if v == "" {
return true
}
if strings.ContainsAny(v, "<>${}()") { // <token>, ${VAR}, $(cmd), {{ tpl }}
return true
}
if maskedRe.MatchString(v) || constRefRe.MatchString(v) || dottedRefRe.MatchString(v) {
return true
}
if placeholderWords[strings.ToLower(v)] {
return true
}
// a value made of one repeated character carries no information
if strings.Count(v, string(v[0])) == len(v) {
return true
}
return false
}
// scanDiff finds suspicious added lines in a unified diff. Only added lines are
// examined: removing a secret is what we want people to do.
func scanDiff(diff string) []secretHit {
var hits []secretHit
file := ""
lineNo := 0
for _, ln := range strings.Split(diff, "\n") {
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(ln, "+++ "):
file = ""
if m := diffFileRe.FindStringSubmatch(ln); m != nil {
file = m[1]
}
continue
case strings.HasPrefix(ln, "@@"):
if m := diffHunkRe.FindStringSubmatch(ln); m != nil {
lineNo, _ = strconv.Atoi(m[1])
}
continue
case strings.HasPrefix(ln, "---") || strings.HasPrefix(ln, "diff ") ||
strings.HasPrefix(ln, "index ") || strings.HasPrefix(ln, "new file") ||
strings.HasPrefix(ln, "deleted file") || strings.HasPrefix(ln, "similarity "):
continue
case strings.HasPrefix(ln, "-"):
continue // removed line: not our problem
case !strings.HasPrefix(ln, "+"):
lineNo++ // context line
continue
}
text := ln[1:]
if kind := matchSecret(text); kind != "" {
hits = append(hits, secretHit{file: file, lineNo: lineNo, kind: kind, text: text})
}
lineNo++
}
return hits
}
// allowMarker suppresses the check for one line. Any scanner needs a per-line
// escape: a project will eventually hold something credential-shaped on
// purpose, and switching the whole check off for that is far too blunt.
const allowMarker = "mgsh:allow"
// matchSecret returns the kind of credential a line appears to contain, or "".
func matchSecret(text string) string {
if strings.Contains(text, allowMarker) {
return ""
}
for _, p := range secretPatterns {
m := p.re.FindStringSubmatch(text)
if m == nil {
continue
}
if p.certain {
return p.kind
}
// the first non-empty capture group is the value that was assigned
value := ""
for _, g := range m[1:] {
if g != "" {
value = g
break
}
}
if !looksLikePlaceholder(value) {
return p.kind
}
}
return ""
}
// secretScanEnabled reports whether the scan runs. It is on unless explicitly
// switched off, so a typo in the setting leaves the safety net in place.
func secretScanEnabled() bool { return !falsy(cfg.SecretScan) }
// secretsApproved scans what `push` has staged. With nothing suspicious found
// it returns true silently; otherwise it shows the findings and asks. Returns
// false when the push should stop.
func secretsApproved(dir string) bool {
if !secretScanEnabled() {
return true
}
diff, err := gitCapture(dir, "diff", "--cached", "-U0", "--no-color")
if err != nil {
return true // nothing staged, or no HEAD yet: not our call to block
}
hits := scanDiff(diff)
if len(hits) == 0 {
return true
}
fmt.Println(col(cRed, fmt.Sprintf("%d possible credential(s) in what is about to be committed:", len(hits))))
for _, h := range hits {
where := h.file
if h.lineNo > 0 {
where += ":" + strconv.Itoa(h.lineNo)
}
fmt.Printf(" %s %s\n %s\n",
col(cYellow, where), col(cDark, h.kind), col(cRed, ellipsis(strings.TrimSpace(h.text), 100)))
}
fmt.Println(col(cDark, " (set 'secretscan = off' to skip this check)"))
return yesno("push anyway?", false)
}
// ellipsis shortens s to at most n characters.
func ellipsis(s string, n int) string {
if len(s) <= n {
return s
}
return s[:n-1] + "…"
}